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If the three works reviewed here say anything in general to all readers of this 
journal, it is the importance of clearly specifying one's theoretical/ideological 
position in one's analysis. It simply is inadequate for social analysts in the region 
to hide their own theories under the thoroughly discredited guise that they are 
letting the facts speak or that others are being too polemical. More than ever we 
need to join history and the human sciences and neither bury ourselves in 'the 
facts' nor in the heavens. If the three demonstrate anything specific with respect 
to the title-question of this review, it is that the question still awaits much more 
detailed and informed analysis. Serious scholarship cannot accept at face value 
that 
Co-operation is a religion pure and simple. It is something which all your 
senses recognize and long for in proportion to the good there is in you.2 
Surely 'good' 'little people' and good little analysts need to ask more critical 
questions. 
R. JAMES SACOUMAN 
2 Grain Growers' Guide, 18 October 1911. 
An Enterprising Conference 
Since the 1920s "regional disparity", as Maritimers viewed it, or "Maritime 
underdevelopment", as it seemed to many central Canadians, has remained a 
perennial topic of controversy and concern. Since 1970, however, fresh scholarly 
interest has added new methodologies, dimensions, and intensity to the subject. 
Newfoundland has been at the eastern end of this new wave of Maritime or 
Atlantic studies, and the present volume of Proceedings of the Second 
Conference sponsored by the Maritime History Group of Memorial University 
of Newfoundland, The Enterprising Canadians: Entrepreneurs and Economic 
Development in Eastern Canada (St. John's, MUN, 1979), edited by Lewis R. 
Fischer and Eric W. Sager, underlines Memorial's role in the movement. At the 
western end are those responsible for the initiation of the modern Acadiensis, 
especially the founding members from the Department of History in the Univer-
sity of New Brunswick. Between these geographic limits, industrial Cape 
Breton has prompted innovative, class-oriented and Marxist studies of labour's 
political and social condition and protest. Unfortunately, the rest of Nova 
Scotia has not been so generously treated, much of New Brunswick even less so, 
and Prince Edward Island only occasionally. The new Atlantic literature is thus 
very uneven. Those first on the scene have presented broad syntheses of Mari-
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time history and of regional underdevelopment. As the volume under review 
suggests, others are now turning to less lofty subjects and are undertaking the 
painstaking parish level of studies that should precede further attempts to 
produce comprehensive analyses. It is not surprising that the volume often 
exhibits the confusion in scale and in definition that may accompany a period of 
transition. 
To an older generation the reasons for the economic decline of the Maritimes 
were remarkably simple. Popular Maritime opinion emphasized the failure of 
Maritime politicians to strike a better bargain with conspiring and greedy 
Canadians at Confederation. More sophisticated analysts found explanations 
in long-term scarcities of natural resources, reliance on staples exports, and the 
overpowering size of external capital and of new transportation technologies.1 
Even the region's mid-nineteenth-century Golden Age was seen as illusory, for 
external events like the Crimean and American Civil War had provided only 
temporary and highly circumstantial market opportunities for Maritime ship-
ping and export activity.2 With Confederation, other factors hastened the 
"inevitable" decline: locational disadvantage, capital depletion, the lack of a 
local metropolitan centre, and the impact of new tariff structures on a free trade 
economy and a primitive system of public finance.1 More recently, the region's 
basic social and cultural fabric has been attacked as a source of the area's 
"conservatism" (for which read "backwardness") and of its "localism" (read 
"parochialism"). In their defence of local values Maritimers have been belittled 
as unprogressive and from misapplied American historiography, even as 
"paranoid".4 
The older critics also found little foundation for the charge that Confedera-
tion was the source of Maritime decline, because eastern regional regression was 
regarded as inevitable in purely local terms and in relation to world trading 
patterns. Maritimers should then have possessed both the vision and the grace to 
1 J.B. Brebner, Canada: A Modern History (Ann Arbor, 1970), p. 282; Donald Creighton, 
Dominion of the North (Toronto, 1972), pp. 301, 355-6; Edgar Mclnnis, Canada: A Political 
and Social History (Toronto, 1969), pp. 248, 301-2; S.A. Saunders, The Economic History of the 
Maritime Provinces (Ottawa, 1939), pp. 1, 33; William Menzies Whitelaw, The Maritimes and 
Canada before Confederation (Toronto, 1966), pp. 36-7; William Woodfine, "Canada's 
Atlantic Provinces: A Study in Regional Economic Retardation" in Mel Watkins and D.F. 
Forster, eds., Economics Canada (Toronto, 1964), pp. 316-7. 
2 S.A. Saunders, "The Maritime Provinces and the Reciprocity Treaty", in G.A. Rawlyk, ed., 
Historical Essays on the Atlantic Provinces (Toronto, 1967), pp. 161-78. 
3 In addition to the historians listed above, see J.M.S. Careless, "Aspects of Metropolitanism in 
Atlantic Canada" in Mason Wade, ed., Regionalism in the Canadian Community, 1867-1967 
(Toronto, 1969), pp. 117-29. 
4 G.A. Rawlyk, "Nova Scotia Regional Protest, 1867-1914", Queen's Quarterly, 75 (Spring 
1968), pp. 105-23 and his "The Maritimes and the Canadian Community" in Wade, ed., 
Regionalism, pp. 102-3. 
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accept a subordinate role before the grander mission of Canadian nation-
building. History was on the side of water and land routes from central Canada 
to the West, of repopulation and immigration west of the Maritimes, and of 
protected centralist industry — a truly national policy. As inevitable as the 
Maritimes' decline was the combination of economic vision and political will 
that ensured central Canada's commercial penetration of the west and its 
industrial penetration of the Maritimes. Even Maritime scholars like Saunders 
and Woodfine, and outsiders sympathetic to the Maritimes' plight like Brebner 
and Careless, upheld this call to the higher vision of nation-building regardless 
of the interests of those who would bear the costs. 
A new direction was initiated by Roy George, in A Leader and a Laggard: 
Manufacturing and Industry in Nova Scotia, Quebec and Ontario (Toronto, 
1970), who concluded that "cost differences of [his selected] factor inputs cannot 
explain the shortage of new plants" (p. 105), and could not explain the gap in the 
relative stages of Nova Scotian and central Canadian industrial development. 
The decisive factor must be a failure in Maritime economic leadership. After 
George, revisionists continued their attack on the earlier nationalist and 
determinist writers. Bruce Archibald's "The Development of Underdevelop-
ment in the Atlantic Provinces" (MA thesis, Dalhousie University, 1971) and 
his article on "Atlantic Regional Underdevelopment and Socialism" in Laurier 
LaPierre et al., eds., Essays on the Left, Essays in Honour of T.C. Douglas 
(Toronto, 1971), pp. 103-120, used André Gunder Frank's model for Latin 
American underdevelopment. Applying Frank's heartland-hinterland, capitalist 
satellite dependency model, Archibald traced the continuity of Maritime 
colonial status from British to central Canadian imperialism. His explanation 
rested heavily on capital transfers from Maritime banks and other institutions to 
central Canadian bodies, but failed to place this process sufficiently in a polit-
ical context, offering little more than an extension of Saunders' deterministic 
process with a sharper definition of Canadian neo-colonialism. Its greatest 
weakness in following Saunders was the failure to perceive and account for the 
impressive local industrial growth following the National Policy in the 1880s. 
In 1971 T.W. Acheson completed "The Social Origins of Industrialism: A 
Study in the Structure of Entrepreneurship" (PhD, University of Toronto, 1971) 
and in 1972 published "The National Policy and the Industrialization of the 
Maritimes 1880-1910" in Acadiensis, I (Spring 1972), pp. 3-28. These were 
followed in 1977 by "The Maritimes and 'Empire Canada'" in David Bercuson, 
ed., Canada and the Burden of Unity (Toronto, 1977). Acheson's was the 
strongest attack upon the earlier fatalistic thesis of Maritime decline as being 
inevitable with or without Confederation. Maritimers had responded to the 
National Policy, had sought an escape from being predominantly staples pro-
ducers, and had set out to capture continental markets with new volumes and 
kinds of manufactured products. Merchant-shippers, lumberers, shipbuilders 
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and others had poured their limited capital into new manufacturing facilities 
whose volume of output could only be justified if new central markets were 
found. The Maritimes' own consumptive capacity was far below its new produc-
tive power, which put a premium upon production methods, management, 
capital and particularly distribution. Acheson emphasized four weaknesses in 
this process: the limits on experience and continuity in Maritime family entre-
preneurship; the limits of local capital formation; the need for a regionally 
sensitive national transportation system; and the importance of developing a 
regional metropolitan centre. From such a centre, local capital-intensive facil-
ities might have provided barriers against centralist capital and banking regula-
tions, and there might have arisen the complementary political strength and 
coordination to win important federal "political interventions with only a 
marginal decline in national living standards".5 In effect, Confederation 
eventually led to the "annexation" even of an economically resurgent Mari-
times. By the 1920s staples production had returned and neo-colonialism was 
again in the saddle. Acheson had supplied a most productive counter-thesis to 
George's. 
Acheson's work must be linked with succeeding writers: among the most 
important is Ernest Forbes and, supportively, William Y. Smith and David 
Alexander. Forbes adds a vital political dimension, emphasizing railroad trans-
portation factors both within the region and in its export potential. His mono-
graph The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919-1927: A Study in Canadian 
Regionalism (Toronto, 1979) should be associated with his essay, "Misguided 
Symmetry: The Destruction of Regional Transport Policy for the Maritimes" in 
Bercuson, op. cit. In both he stresses the centralists' neglect of Confederation 
commitments to Halifax and St. John while Grand Trunk interests in Portland 
were protected and he outlines the crucial importance of the German-style 
bureaucratic entrepreneurialism undertaken by the Maritimes' federally-owned 
Intercolonial Railway. The Intercolonial encouraged intra-regional trade by 
sensitive rate structures and offered vital export incentives to Maritime pro-
ducers seeking the central Canadian market. Because of the failure of local 
boards of trade or politicians to create such economic strategies, the Inter-
colonial's role was critical. As William Smith reminded us in his "How Ontario 
Achieved its Imperial Position", Acadiensis, VI (Autumn 1976), pp. 144-51, 
Oliver Mowat's government and its successors set a model of policy formulation 
with the protectionist policy of "the manufacturing condition", transport initia-
tives like the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railway, and the creation of 
Ontario Hydro. Achieving a consensus among Ontario's businessmen, politi-
cians and bureaucrats was a useful step in confirming the centralist domination 
that would equate central Canada's interests with the national interest. When 
5 T.W. Acheson, "The Maritimes and 'Empire Canada'", p. 102. 
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the ICR was "nationalized" and its regionally sensitive rate structures were 
demolished, Forbes argues in The Maritime Rights Movement, "a major 
agency for independent regional development was extinguished and the 
metropolitan domination of the Maritime economy firmly consolidated" 
(p. 71). The centralists' triumph, however, precipitated an era of activism in the 
Maritime Rights movement that belies Rawlyk's assertion that the protest was 
only empty and opportunistic sloganeering. Depopulation, redistribution, the 
reduction of federal cabinet representation and local provincial differences did 
make it difficult to mount a countervailing Maritime political force in the face 
of the centralists' overwhelming political strength. The depletion of economic 
direction along Acheson's lines and of political strength along Forbes' would 
prove a dispiriting combination. Thus, the crisis of regional disparity, which had 
«or been inevitable during the Confederation era, was clearly revealed by the 
1920s. This conclusion was affirmed by David Alexander in "Economic Growth 
in the Atlantic Region 1880-1940", Acadiensis, VIII (Autumn, 1978), pp. 47-76. 
Two other scholars have added emphasis to these conclusions: John Baker in 
"The Underdevelopment of Atlantic Canada 1867-1920: A Study of the Devel-
opment of Capitalism" (MA thesis, McMaster University, 1977) and in "Bank-
ing and Underdevelopment of Atlantic Canada, 1867-1920" (unpublished paper 
presented to the annual meetings of the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology 
Association, Fredericton, 12 June 1977); and David Frank in "Coal Masters 
and Coal Miners: The 1922 Strike and the Roots of Class Conflict in the 
Cape Breton Coal Industry" (MA thesis, Dalhousie University, 1974) and his 
equally skilled article, "The Cape Breton Coal Industry and the Rise and Fall 
of the British Empire Steel Corporation", Acadiensis, VII (Autumn 1977), 
pp. 3-34.6 Baker's account argues the merits of a Marxist analysis, which may 
satisfy an ideological goal, but adds little to the weight and direction of his 
sound empirical evidence. Baker deals with many of the factors emphasized by 
Acheson and Forbes: productive and capital concentration in central Canada, 
the differences between Confederation promises and performance, transporta-
tion policies of federal governments, the positive but fragile response of the 
Maritimes to the industrial incentives of the National Policy. There is some 
attempt at class analysis, particularly among the Maritimes' own merchants, 
but it is largely theoretical rather than empirical. One of Baker's strongest suits 
is his attention to the political and legislative aspects of central Canadian bank-
ing practices in contrast to Maritime methods. The ideology of the centralist 
capitalists is best treated by Baker, and he significantly extends this aspect of 
Forbes' political analysis. David .Frank combined a Marxist approach with a 
splendid command of empirical economic, social and political factors in the 
6 See also his "Class Conflict in the Coal Industry: Cape Breton 1922", in Gregory S. Kealey 
and Peter Warrian, eds. Essays in Canadian Working Class History (Toronto, 1976), pp. 
161-84.' 
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Cape Breton coal fields and in Montreal's boardrooms. His indictment of 
BESCO, his appreciation of the anomalies in the National Policy that made it a 
centralist instrument, his insights into the life and values of the miners and of 
their radicalization are among the impressive features of his work. The political 
impact of Besco's manoeuverings are effectively traced in union activities and 
municipal politics in the Sydney area. We may question the general application 
of his approach because he is dealing with a specific class conflict at a particular 
moment and in a special industry. Roy Wolvin was not typical of central 
Canadian capitalists. Nonetheless, as an example by which to test other less 
class-conscious and less concentrated workers and less industrialized Maritime 
communities, Frank added a sophisticated and highly professional case study. 
Although a few other useful articles and monographs have appeared, the pre-
ceding constitute the major works in the new historiography of modern Mari-
time economic activity.7 The essays in The Enterprising Canadians cannot be 
said to address themselves uniformly to the questions raised in the new litera-
ture. Many are useful case studies, whose general application the writers do not 
presume to suggest. Some look squarely at Alexander's and George's question 
of the entrepreneurial role; some ignore it; some extend the definition of the 
term so broadly — especially in relation to commercial activity as against 
industrial — as to lack any precision. Nearly half of the essays are not con-
cerned with the period on which the new historiography has been focussed; some 
are not strictly laid in the Maritime-Newfoundland region although they have a 
comparative value. As Alexander admits, the Conference often "circled 
around" the question of entrepreneurship (p. 4). It also avoided confronting a 
common definition of the region, settling for the weaker "Eastern Canada" in 
the title. We should be grateful, however, to the sponsors of this pioneering con-
ference. Some of its papers are bound to influence many more disciplined 
studies not only of entrepreneurship but of larger regional, economic, political 
and social issues. 
Three papers, by David McDougall, Rosemary Ommer and F.W. Remiggi, 
treat aspects of maritime industry in the Gaspé. While all raise interesting points 
of contrast with merchant capitalist patterns in New Brunswick and Nova 
7 These include: T.W. Acheson, "The Great Merchant and Economic Development in St. John 
1820-1850", Acadiensis, VIII (Spring 1979), pp. 3-27; David Alexander, "Development and 
Dependence in Newfoundland 1880-1970", Acadiensis, IV (Autumn 1974). pp. 3-31: Robert 
Brym and R. James Sacouman, eds., Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic 
Canada (Toronto, 1979); Don Macgillivray, "Henry Melville Whitney Comes to Cape Breton: 
The Saga of a Gilded Age Entrepreneur", Acadiensis, IX (Autumn 1979), pp. 44-70; L.D. 
McCann, "Staples and the New Industrialism in the Growth of Post-Confederation Halifax", 
Acadiensis, IX (Spring 1979), pp. 47-79; C.R. McKay, "Investors, Government and the 
CMTR: a Study of Entrepreneurial Failure", Acadiensis, IX (Autumn 1979), pp. 71-94: Brian 
Tennyson, "Economic Nationalism and Confederation: A Case Study in Cape Breton", 
Acadiensis, II (Autumn 1972), pp. 39-53. 
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Scotia, they are not particularly useful in addressing the volume's main concern 
with Maritime entrepreneurial weakness and regional disparity. McDougalPs 
evidence suggests that as in much of the Maritimes, older family-oriented and 
local English-speaking entrepreneurs scattered in small outports generated most 
of Gaspé Bay's early entrepreneurial activity. We do not, however, gain much 
insight into why this pattern developed, and the account of its decline does not 
carry us beyond the usual macro-regional explanations of competition from the 
Intercolonial Railway, the abrogation of Reciprocity, and technological change. 
More useful is Ommer's account of the intricate structure of the Jersey cod 
traders and shipbuilders, and of how their enterprise had a multiplier effect upon 
New World forest and supply trades. Jersey's failure to keep pace with 
technological change and to develop a significant industrial base prompt 
Ommer to suggest more investigation into "the manner in which relatively 
marginal societies were tied into the North Atlantic economy" (p. 201). The 
Maritimes' problems may not simply have been those prompted by the National 
Policy or by conditions peculiar to Canada's eastern provinces. 
Two of the volume's liveliest papers are those by Lewis R. Fischer on '"An 
Engine Yet Moderate': James Peake, Entrepreneurial Behaviour and the Ship-
ping Industry of Nineteenth Century Prince Edward Island" and by Carman 
Miller on "A Knight in Business: Some Aspects of Sir F.W. Borden's Business 
Affairs, 1896-1917". Fischer presents the volume's most systematic attempt to 
define and assess entrepreneurship. To measure entrepreneurial behaviour, 
Fischer adopts from David McClelland's model in The Achieving Society six 
standards: risk-taking, innovation, decision-making, personal responsibility, 
anticipation, and overall organization. In judging James Peake's record, how-
ever, he concentrates on the first two elements — risk-taking and innovation — 
in such ventures as Peake's entering the Gulf fisheries, the selective export of 
Island root crops, adopting steam technology, pursuit of bolder deep-sea trade 
routes, and ventures in marine insurance and ship chandlery. Fischer's stress 
upon innovation presents problems in the tiny Atlantic region, as he admits. 
Moreover, he does not sufficiently pursue his own suggestion that maritime 
business activity may not be related only to profit-making or to strictly material 
ends. Fischer's four remaining standards of entrepreneurship are only briefly 
treated in Peake's case. Yet they are more closely associated with "rational 
planning and management" and, as Fischer concludes, may be the best 
"organizing concept for future scholars interested in explaining regional dis-
parity" (p. 115). As Fischer warns, the material available on Peake is "too 
sketchy" to permit a direct application of his six-point model of entrepreneur-
ship. What is needed are studies of varieties of "entrepreneurial techniques, 
investments and behaviours" (ibid.) from comparable regional individuals and 
communities. Fischer's own horizons stop with the island. Questions of external 
control and of local management in a colonial economy are raised but barely 
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addressed. Fischer's remarkable account of Peake's achievements in 
mid-nineteenth-century P.E.I., however, emphasizes how much might be done to 
probe Maritime regionalism, its elitism, and the relations between economic 
activity, political life, and social values in Atlantic Canada. 
Carman Miller's "knight in business", F.W. Borden, is just such a pluralistic 
figure. Operating during a period characterized by "an incestuous relationship 
between business and politics", Borden "cultivated to a high degree the fine art 
of patronage" (p. 233). In this sprightly paper we are given a portrait of one who 
"was not prepared to devote himself completely to making money. He had other 
interests" (p. 242). Miller properly portrays Borden as Acheson's model of the 
1880s Maritime industrial elite: "a community entrepreneur . . . who on most 
issues tended to side with his community rather than his class".8 Social values 
and aspirations brought Borden satisfaction. In the end they carried him out of 
the counting house and into impossible challenges to operate his many-sided 
business ventures at a distance, and without having developed a decision-making 
process that allowed him to delegate authority with confidence. His world had 
been a close-knit one of friends and relatives as business associates, of localism, 
and of "binding people to himself (p. 246). The alien corporate capitalism and 
industrialism that had captured much of the Maritimes business scene by the 
turn of the century no longer reflected Borden's earlier world. Miller modestly 
questions how far Borden's experience and values may represent regional busi-
ness behaviour and how far "the 'one by one' study of individuals" {ibid.) may 
carry us, but he offers here a promising beginning to what one can hope may be 
many more such studies, on which we may then base broader models and 
syntheses. Miller's paper suggests that, while we must strive to measure these 
eastern "enterprising Canadians" by increasingly sophisticated models of 
structural and economic theory, we must also see them within their particular 
political culture, their class structure, and their linkage with community values. 
A standard entrepreneurial approach, even a more precisely defined one, is not 
likely to be wholly appropriate to the Maritimes scene. 
Graeme Wynn's "Industrialism, Entrepreneur ship, and Opportunity in the 
New Brunswick Timber Trade" offers a nice balance between structural theory 
and schematization with empirical data drawn from the timber industry. The 
timber trade was "a connective enterprise" (p. 8) and we are shown the commer-
cial structure of the trade from contract lumberer and farmer-lumberer to the 
occasional jobber and the ubiquitous merchant-wholesaler. While Wynn argues 
convincingly that the St. John valley demonstrates "the quintessential character 
of the mercantile landscape" (p. 12) of New Brunswick's timber trade, more of 
his data might have been drawn from the northeast. An economic model set in a 
valley which invites geographic determinism is disturbingly complete. Increas-
8 T.W. Acheson, "The Social Origins of the Canadian Industrial Elite, 1880-1885", in David S. 
Macmillan, ed., Canadian Business History (Toronto, 1972), p. 171. 
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ing concentration of management and authority in the northeast timber trade 
may also have responded to a valley economy on the Miramichi and other great 
rivers. But how far did the ethnic qualities of the poor Irish immigrant and the 
Acadian contribute to the proletarianization of the timber cutters? Further, how 
much did the northeast's specialization of work functions owe to the entre-
preneurial spirit and methods of the Glasgow-directed business culture, with 
such big northeastern operators as Pollok, Gilmour or Robert Rankin? As 
Phillip Buckner asks in one of the six useful summaries of discussion, what are 
the limits of regionalism in the New Brunswick trade? Did British events, 
connections and market conditions affect the supply centres across the Atlantic? 
"Eastern Canada", "the Maritimes", "The Atlantic Provinces", "the trans-
atlantic economy": defining regionalism and assessing the environment in which 
attitudes and business practises were generated haunt most of the contributors 
to this volume. Wynn suggests that the nineteenth century may have witnessed 
"a series of island communities . . . slenderly tied into wider patterns of 
communication" (p. 121). 
Wynn's macro-level contribution stands in contrast to Clarence LeBreton's 
"Les Blackhall: Histoire d'Une Famille et de son Influence". The paper builds a 
micro-model of local family enterprise bridging commerce, local administration 
and marriage brokerage. It is an excellent and subtle introduction to the econ-
omy and society of northeastern New Brunswick. We gain a two-tiered insight 
into the role of family and kinship relations in the Jersey-dominated trade 
around Caraquet. In his tantalizingly short paper, LeBreton suggests the nature 
of the local family-structured Acadian society, while providing an intriguing 
sketch of the quasi-entrepreneurial role of one family among the minority 
Anglophone community who acted as intermediaries between the Acadians and 
the dominant merchant class. Emphasis upon blood and kinship roles is also 
pursued by Gregg Finley, who deals with a remarkable shipbuilding dynasty, 
"The Morans of St. Martins, N.B., 1850-1880: Toward an Understanding of 
Family Participation in Maritime Enterprise". With these papers we move 
further away from economic and structural approaches to embrace social and 
cultural explanations for local enterprise and its successes and limitations. 
Unfortunately, Finley's account lacks a geographic context. Resource and 
locational factors affected St. Martins' growth as the largest Fundy shipbuilding 
outport. Limitations of soil and of sea as a source of fish narrowed the region's 
options, but the richness of the forest cover invited concentration upon ship-
building. Finley underplays St. Martins' nearness to St. John with its merchant 
and shipping ambitions; St. John merchants provided a source of early entre-
preneurial and capital development until St. Martins' own entrepreneurs could 
develop their operations. Scale is another factor: the landward isolation and tiny 
social boundaries of St. Martins offered an unusual opportunity for the enter-
prising Moran family to turn a small contract-shipbuilding operation into a 
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remarkably large-scale shipbuilding, shipping and overseas commodity market 
empire with a Mersey subsidiary by the 1850s. One important assumption in 
Finley's paper, which will have to be tested in further studies, is that St. Martins 
was not unique but only the most successful example of coastal shipbuilding 
communities in the Atlantic region. 
Kinship solidarity and family involvement are the central themes of Finley's 
explanation for both the rise and the ultimate decline of the Morans' undertak-
ings. Through several generations cooperation in the basic physical skills of 
building led to differentiation and coordination of more specific and sophis-
ticated skills, such as master shipbuilder, master of a vessel, and resident over-
seas agent. This progression is traced from simple fraternal beginnings to father-
son involvement, but Finley also outlines the role of wives and daughters in 
ensuring continuity. To the emulation implicit in the father-son relationship, he 
adds the role of reinforcer played by mothers and wives in fashioning "a home 
environment whose focus was toward the sea" and which "perpetuated the 
sensibilities of a maritime life-style by creating a sense of solidarity and purpose 
in the home" (p. 45). Finley's theme of woman's role in personal and communal 
enterprise is another valuable reminder of our neglect of women's studies in the 
Atlantic region. It would also be useful to explore more fully the role of other 
families than the Morans and their middle class peers. The shipbuilding industry 
was often also a family-oriented business in its work force. The skills, the defer-
ence and the size of the large local labour pool were also tied to the Morans' 
enterprise. Leaders require those ready to be led, and the extended family char-
acter of all classes in the Atlantic outports was an important factor through 
generations. Non-union labour gave to the Morans' enterprise and imagination 
a concrete expression; the dynamics and interdependence of all classes in ports 
such as St. Martins must be fully explored before we can have a picture in the 
round. 
Finley's emphasis on kinship is both supported and challenged by Paula and 
Lawrence Felt in "Capital Accumulation and Industrial Development in Nine-
teenth Century New Brunswick". They affirm Finley's case study, citing 
Burton Benedict's earlier stress on the usefulness of family connections in 
financing and in recruitement of personnel when skills are at relatively low 
scales of specialization and large-scale capital is not readily available or needed. 
They depart from Finley's Moran model, however, and parenthetically chal-
lenge T.W. Acheson's explanation that Atlantic entrepreneurial success was 
partly plagued by the failure of entrepreneurial and filial succession. From their 
own researches they argue that there were numerous exceptions to Acheson's 
evidence of the failure of sons to carry on in their fathers' footsteps. Moreover, 
by marrying into other merchant-industrial families or by espousing their 
fathers' imported hired managers, daughters frequently became useful agents in 
preserving the trust, diversification and continuity that were essential to the 
further growth of many Atlantic family-centered businesses. The Felts also draw 
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brief attention to non-familial linkages in Maritime economic development — 
"primary loyalties generally — school, church and other community-based ties 
— in effecting operations necessary to the stability and growth of the firm" (pp. 
64-5). I have referred above to the significance of the work force. Another 
source of Maritime entrepreneurial strengths (and ultimately of weaknesses) 
may arise from cultural factors. What was the nature of the community itself in 
which some businessmen so thrived that they not merely built initial commercial 
and simple industrial operations, but they or their descendants had the will and 
capacity to adapt successfully to different ventures as times and technology 
changed? In "Cradle of Enterprise: Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, 1840-1889", a 
highly systematic paper that is dense with statistics and the genealogy of 74 
resident shipowners, Gerry Panting gives further prominence to the importance 
of family origins in early business growth. Significantly his families later show a 
capacity to adapt to formations beyond simple partnership, and to move from 
their role as merchant-shippers to realms of finance, metal works, textiles, rail-
ways and utilities. The multi-generational pattern is repeated here, as with 
Finley's Morans, although we are again given only a middle class managerial 
spectrum. Two successive family 'connections' — the Killams and the Lovitts — 
stand as examples and leaders of the risk-taking and adaptability that ensured 
Yarmouth's continued economic health amid conditions that elsewhere under-
mined Maritime merchant and industrial independence. Later, marriages also 
broadened the opportunities for larger scale capital formation when new tech-
nologies made it necessary to diversify and extend investment. Like the Scottish 
community of New Glasgow — which could profitably have been included in 
this conference's considerations — which pushed the lifespan of its independent 
economic activity well beyond the Maritimes' norm in this era of Montreal take-
overs, Yarmouth's cohesion and adaptability need further explanation. Panting 
only hints at the reasons in his opening paragraphs, and tells us little in his 
abrupt conclusion. Some insights, however, were elicited in the discussion that 
followed. 
In reply to questions, Panting stressed factors like religious homogeneity, an 
elitist merchant circle of residents only, and the town's common New England 
origins, small scale and intimacy, and contended that "shipowning was an excel-
lent training for the development of an entrepreneurial mentality" (p. 275). 
When the question was raised as to whether "such an explanation was valid 
because it elevated cultural factors above all others" (ibid.), Panting persisted in 
affirming a strong cultural explanation, but he makes little of the point in his 
paper. His documentation includes R.M. Aitken's study of Yarmouth which, 
while much less dependent upon quantitative data and more general in thesis, 
offers a distinctly cultural explanation for Yarmouth's unique performance.9 
9 R.M. Aitken, "Localism and National Identity in Yarmouth, N.S., 1830-1870" (MA thesis, 
Trent University, 1975). 
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Like greater New Glasgow, which derived much from the commercial and 
industrial spirit and connections with Scotland and north Britain, Yarmouth 
continued to emulate the self-reliant and innovative qualities of New England. 
Given Panting's support of a cultural thesis, his paper could profitably have 
stressed the town's pervading commercial spirit. The enterprise of its early 
"Long Wharf merchant-shippers was mirrored and buttressed by constant 
public discussion and activity in its numerous study clubs, its several naviga-
tional schools, its practical school curriculum, its booster newspapers, and in the 
effective system of clientage it enjoyed over a wide rural and coastal network of 
other shippers, lumbermen and fishermen, Coordination between its business 
interests and its political representation was one of the town's strong charac-
teristics. Indeed, the political dimension — municipal incorporation, municipal 
services and financing, and municipal support for industrial growth — is dis-
turbingly absent from most of these papers. Panting succeeds admirably in 
assessing his shipowners' operations within their own sphere; he is less successful 
in tracing their influence upon the town's development or of its influence upon 
them. 
By contrast, Eric Sager leaves us in no doubt of the independent class interests 
of Newfoundland entrepreneurs in "The Merchants of Water Street and 
Capital Investment in Newfoundland's Traditional Economy". The St. John's 
merchants wielded "a high degree of control over the maritime economy" 
(p. 77) by the concentration of large-vessel tonnage in their hands, through their 
dominant marketing function in fish and seals, and as principal owners of mari-
time capital stock. Although this dominance did not remain constant, the 
decision to retrench, Sager insists, rested with the metropolitan merchants 
themselves. Further, despite a depression in the fisheries in the 1860s, a few St. 
John's merchants continued to invest expansively in the entire fleet. 
Unfortunately, unlike Panting, Sager does not — perhaps could not, from the 
want of surviving records — tell us who these merchants were, whether they 
were interlocked in partnership or more complex business relationships, 
or how far blood, marriage and generational elements affected these two sets of 
decisions toward retrenchment and expansion. The basis for comparison with 
other papers in the volume is thereby reduced, although Sager's account in it 
own terms is impressive. Where Panting and Aitken might allude to the cultural 
milieu of Yarmouth which appears to have encouraged self-reliance, 
technological and business adaptation, and family connectional means, Sager 
only concludes sympathetically of the St. John's merchants that "This was not a 
task for any small group of 19th century merchants, even if they had understood 
the problems" (p. 93). They had, he argues, no option but to reduce their risks 
by withdrawing from the maritime industry. One wonders why Panting's Lovitt 
connection in Yarmouth did not accept this lesson so readily, or why the St. 
John's merchants did not turn to government and other sources of capital for 
support in maintaining the traditional maritime economy. 
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One explanation arises from Sager's sense of timing. Many merchants had 
already been attracted to Newfoundland's new continental model of economic 
growth — that expansive era of diversification in railroad, mining, agriculture, 
lumber, pulping and manufacture. Unfortunately, we are not told what 
proportion of merchant capitalists took up the industrial capitalists' challenge, 
nor how much initiative and initial capital came from outside Newfoundland to 
produce these new ventures. Nonetheless, Sager posits that the entrepreneurial 
spirit was still alive in his island control group — and implies that sensible 
re-direction is another quality of the entrepreneur who cannot be more 
adventurous. Those merchants who lacked enough capital to enter the 
continental economy turned more heavily to their complementary function as 
suppliers, wholesale and retail, of those goods and services now required by the 
new land-based industries. By their decisions, Sager argues, the merchants were 
pursuing class interests at the expense of "the welfare of [Newfoundland's] 
major industry and its people" (p. 93). Sager leaves us, then, with a troubling 
double standard: on the one hand, the merchants had little choice but to shift to 
more promising ventures, and were proving their entrepreneurship by doing so; 
on the other, while asserting their helplessness to do otherwise, Sager finds fault 
with their abandoning the industry that had traditionally embraced the vast 
majority of the island's people. Was it the merchants' responsibility to foresee 
the island's unpromising economic future and to accept responsibility for its 
general well being? Were they being shortsighted by their standards or by ours? 
Moreover, was their failure not as much political as economic? And why did 
such "failures" occur at the political level, since the merchants held considerable 
political power? 
Perhaps St. John's was not itself sufficiently sophisticated or mature in such 
matters to generate an informed general discussion of the whole economy and of 
the reciprocal concerns and responsibilities of all classes for the island's 
economic health. David Sutherland, writing of "The Personnel and Policies of 
the Halifax Board of Trade, 1890-1914", reminds us that Newfoundland was 
not alone in confronting problems of leadership in the face of economic change. 
In one of the volume's most useful articles Sutherland probes two of the sources 
of regional disparity and entrepreneurial frustration in the Maritimes: the 
businessmen's failure to come up with significant provincial or regional 
strategies, and the allied failure to put pressure on the even less enterprising 
politicians spawned by an immature or moribund political system. Sutherland 
first outlines the organizational weaknesses of Halifax's Chamber of 
Commerce, a body dominated by the city's wholesale firms, by an aging 
membership, and by its failure to confront crucial economic challenges — 
particularly the tariff question — because of unresolved political partisanship. 
Although the old Chamber was then absorbed into the new and seemingly more 
dynamic Halifax Board of Trade — a retail-centered and more youthful body — 
in 1890, "continuity . . . was . . . the order of the day" (p. 207). The narrow 
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commercial and class lines of the Chamber prevailed; fewer than half of the 
city's business leaders joined the organization; lesser figures served on the 
Board's executive; professional men were notably absent; industrial incentives 
were ignored; threats to the city's rail service and limitations in its port facilities 
were addressed only piecemeal; and the Board never seriously moved beyond 
Halifax's immediate interest to survey and promote the idea of their relation to 
the province's interests at large. The Board's members might have been expected 
to appreciate the gravity and implications of economic change more clearly than 
others. Yet they failed to recognize the long-term results of neglect of the 
fisheries and the West Indies trade, offered no adequate development policies, 
ignored the challenge to social reform on grounds of cost and, while engaging in 
a perennial rivalry with St. John, "never saw fit to comment on" (p. 215) the 
region's common peril, the absorption of local banks by Montreal- and 
Toronto-based corporations. Sutherland ascribes the Board's failures to "the 
traditionalism, elitism, penuriousness and factionalism of the Halifax business 
community" (p. 217). While he concludes by denying that the Board was 
responsible for Halifax's underdevelopment, a condition "derived essentially 
from factors external to the city's business elite", he admits that it did 
"contribute to the community's dilemma" (ibid.). 
The conference that produced this valuable collection of papers deserves 
successors. We have been given a stimulating glimpse through some excellent 
case studies and some frequently helpful theoretical discussions of the problems 
involved in moving from merchant capitalism to industrial. As in several other 
papers, Sutherland's analysis highlights the gulf between private economic 
activity — even when partially represented by some form of association — and 
the political sphere at all levels of Maritime public life. Canadian economic 
centralism drew on greater resource and capital strengths, but it also relied on 
crucial applications of political power. Why countervailing Maritime political 
power was not possible, why it was not coordinated with local economic 
interests, and how far by its absence it compromised the prospects even of the 
most ambitious local entrepreneur is a complementary dimension to which a 
further conference could profitably turn its attention. 
ALAN WILSON 
